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Abstract We study optimal redistributive taxes when individuals differ in two
characteristics—earning ability and leisure needs—assumed to be imperfectly corre-
lated. Individuals have private information about their abilities but needs are observ-
able. With different levels of observable needs the population can be separated into
groups and needs may be used as a tag. We first assume that the social planner considers
individuals should be compensated for their leisure needs and characterize the optimal
redistributive policy, and the extent of compensation for needs, with tagging. We also
consider an alternative social objective where individuals are deemed responsible for
their needs.
JEL Classification H21 · H41
1 Introduction
Individuals divert time away from leisure or paid labor to a variety of duties. Examples
of such duties include the need to take care of children or dependent parents, the
hours devoted to commuting, or the extra time required for daily activities because
of physical or mental disabilities. The amount of time devoted can vary significantly
across individuals, yet these differences are often neglected in tax policy design. In
this paper we incorporate them explicitly and explore the implications for the optimal
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redistributive scheme. In particular, we study the extent and nature of compensation
for leisure needs when needs are observable and may be used as a tag.
In the standard optimal redistributive taxation framework individuals are assumed
to differ in a single characteristic: ability, which is private information but has a
commonly known distribution. The private information nature of this characteristic
imposes limits on the amount of redistribution that can be achieved. In particular, the
redistributive policy must be designed so that individuals are given proper incentives
to reveal their true types. Mirrlees (1971) and Stiglitz (1982) were among the first
to emphasize the implications of informational asymmetries on the design of optimal
taxes, and in particular the role of incentive compatibility constraints.
In reality individuals differ in more than one characteristic. Several authors have
explored whether observable individual characteristics that are correlated with the
unobservable ability can play a role in the design of redistributive policies. In a seminal
paper in the area, Akerlof (1978) showed that “tagging” (i.e. conditioning the tax
on the observable individual characteristic) can enhance social welfare, although for
particular social objectives it violates the principle of horizontal equity.
Over time Akerlof’s tagging idea has gained considerable attention and there is
presently a large interest in the role of tagging in optimal taxation. Recent contributions
include Blomquist and Micheletto (2008), Weinzierl (2011) and Farhi and Werning
(2013)—on age-dependent taxation1—Cremer et al. (2010) and Alesina et al. (2011)—
on gender-based taxation -, Mankiw and Weinzierl (2010)—on height-based taxation -,
and Blumkin et al. (2009)—on race tagging. Until recently the literature had produced
few analytical results on the implications of tagging for the properties of optimal non-
linear income tax schedules. Immonen et al. (1998) employed simulations to explore
the pattern of optimal marginal income tax rates in an economy with a continuum of
abilities and two tagged groups. In a similar setting Cremer et al. (2010) more recently
provided analytical results by assuming quasilinear preferences, a Rawlsian social
welfare function, and a constant and identical elasticity of labor supply within and
across the tagged groups.
The papers mentioned above focused on“pure tagging” cases, where the observ-
able characteristic is used to separate the population into identifiable groups but has no
normative significance. Boadway and Pestieau (2006) studied alternatively the impli-
cations for redistributive taxation of using a tag with normative significance: differ-
ences in consumption needs. They explored the differences between pure tagging and
tagging with consumption needs. They showed that, under reasonable circumstances,
the tax system is more redistributive in the tagged group with the higher proportion of
high-ability individuals, and that inter-group redistribution goes from the group with
higher proportion of high-ability individuals to that with a lower proportion. When
individuals differ in consumption needs and these can be used as a tag, full com-
pensation for needs is optimal if a different tax schedule applies to each group. The
compensation for needs is a component of the optimal inter-group lump-sum redistri-
bution and, within each group, the optimal tax schedule depends on the distribution of
1 Optimal age-dependent taxation had been previously studied by Lozachmeur (2006) in a life-cycle
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ability types in the group. When observable consumption needs cannot be used as a tag
and individuals face a common tax schedule, due for instance to political constraints
or ethical concerns with the violation of horizontal equity, there is generally imperfect
compensation for needs: both under- and over-compensation can result depending on
the correlation between ability and needs.
In a related paper, Boadway and Pestieau (2003) incorporated leisure needs. They
showed that, when leisure needs are observable and used as a tag, the maximin optimum
implies a standard non-linear income tax schedule (i.e. non-distortion at the top and
distortion at the bottom) within each group, and a transfer between groups that depends
on the correlation between ability and needs. They did not provide however explicit
results on compensation for leisure needs. In this paper we explore the extent and
nature of compensation for leisure needs. In order to do so we adopt assumptions
that are relatively common in the tagging literature: namely, additive leisure needs,
quasilinear preferences and a maximin social welfare function. We also discuss the
implications of relaxing these assumptions.
We consider first the case where the social planner deems that leisure needs deserve
compensation and characterize the optimal redistributive policy, and the extent of com-
pensation for needs, with tagging. Even if leisure needs are observable the amount
required to fully compensate individuals for their needs depends on their unobserv-
able ability, which contrasts with the linear consumption needs case in Boadway and
Pestieau (2006), where the amount of compensation for needs is independent of the
ability type. In the maximin solution the low-ability individuals achieve the same util-
ity level regardless of their needs but it is optimal to impose a different tax schedule
in each group: in particular, the marginal tax rates and the effective labor supplied by
low-ability types differ and depend on the distribution of ability types in each group.
High-ability needy individuals can be under- or over-compensated for their needs and
this also depends on the distribution of ability types in each group. It is however worth
highlighting that, in our framework, it is optimal to impose a different tax schedule
in each group even when the proportion of low-ability individuals is the same in both
groups. This result differs from those obtained with linear consumption needs and
stems from the fact that it is more costly for high-ability individuals in the needy
group to pretend to be low-ability.
We also briefly explore the case in which the social planner attempts to hold indi-
viduals responsible for their needs. We believe that this exercise is relevant if the needs
are up to some extent a reflection of the individual’s choice (for instance, the handicap
is the outcome of the individual’s actions). We show that in the second best, contrary
to what would happen in the linear consumption needs case, it is not possible to make
all needy individuals fully responsible for their needs.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we describe the
model with two levels of ability and two levels of leisure needs, and provide the laissez-
faire allocation. In Sect. 3 we characterize the first-best solution, when both ability and
leisure needs are assumed to be observable. We characterize the second-best maximin
optimum, with unobservable ability but observable leisure needs, in Sect. 4. In order
to shed more light on the results we provide a numerical illustration in Sect. 5. In
Sect. 6 we explore the consequences of adopting an alternative social objective in
which the planner attempts to make the individuals responsible for their needs. We
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briefly discuss in Sect. 7 the implications of being unable to observe leisure needs. A
final section concludes. In the appendix we discuss the implications of relaxing some
of the main assumptions.
Before proceeding, it may be worth stressing the policy implications of our exercise.
Weinzierl (2012) has recently argued that real-world taxes make surprisingly limited
use of tagging. He nevertheless highlights notable exceptions, such as the tax treatment
of disabled individuals and families with children, where some sizable tagging does
take place. These are precisely two examples where leisure needs (i.e. time diverted
from leisure and paid labor) are significant. Admittedly, in these cases both consump-
tion and leisure needs play a role. In the rest of the paper we focus on the disability
example as a common thread. Handicapped individuals require more time for daily
activities and often also more consumption goods. We believe that the problem comes
as much, if not more, from the additional time required. We purposely focus on leisure
needs because we believe it is this aspect that has been most often neglected in tax
policy design.2 Note that from a practical implementation point of view information
on leisure needs may be inferred from time use surveys, which are now increasingly
available.
2 The model
We assume that individuals differ in ability and leisure needs and consider the case
with two ability and leisure needs types. Ability is represented by the wage rate wi ,
i = L , H , where L and H stand for low and high ability, respectively (i.e. wH > wL ).
The leisure need is represented by the time spent in unpaid duties  j . In what follows we
normalize the low leisure need to 0 and denote the high leisure need by . Accordingly,
we refer to needy and unneedy individuals j = N , U (i.e. N =  > U = 0).3 There
are hence four types of individuals i j . We assume that individual preferences can be
represented by a quasilinear utility of the form:4
Ui j = ci j − v
(
i j +  j
)
i = L , H ; j = N , U (1)
2 A notable exception for the case of families with children is the recent paper by Maniquet and Neumann
(2015). They compare families of different sizes and use two complementary equivalence scales: the standard
one for consumption and another, less standard, for the time devoted to raise one child.
3 We use unneedy, instead of non-needy, for notational convenience. We are grateful to an anonymous
referee for this suggestion.
4 The Stone–Geary specification has often been employed to represent consumption needs, and was
previously adopted for leisure needs in Boadway and Pestieau (2003). An important aspect of this additive
representation of leisure needs is that the amount required to compensate for needs is increasing in ability.
Most of the examples of handicaps mentioned above have in common that the opportunity cost of the time
devoted to those unpaid tasks differs across ability types. It is for instance generally acknowledged that the
amount of income lost from one hour of commute is larger for high-ability individuals than for low-ability
ones. Other specifications could have been adopted. One possibility would be to incorporate a constant need
parameter δ j ≥ 1 (δ j = 1 for those individuals with no needs) with the disutility term becoming v
(
δ j i j
)
,
which amounts to a proportional reduction in productivity. Another possibility would be v
(
i j + δ j /wi
)
,
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where ci j and i j represent the consumption and the labor supply of individual i j , and
the disutility of labor function v (.) is assumed to be continuous, differentiable, strictly
increasing and strictly convex function (i.e. v′ > 0 and v′′ > 0). The proportion of
individuals with ability i and leisure need j in the population is given by ni j . Adding





ni j = 1.
As pointed out by Boadway and Pestieau (2003), the assumption that individual
utilities are identical net of needs implies that utility levels are comparable among
households. This avoids the conceptual problem of how to define the social planner’s
objective function when individual preferences are different and utilities are non-
comparable (see Boadway et al. (2002) for an analysis of optimal redistribution with
heterogeneous preferences).
In the laissez-faire, each individual chooses ci j and i j to maximize (1) subject to
the budget constraint ci j = wii j . Hence, each i j ( i = L , H ; j = N , U ) solves:
max
i j
Ui j = wi i j − v
(
i j +  j
)
. (2)
The first-order condition (hereafter FOC) is v′ (i j +  j
) = wi . Hence, iU = i N +
(i.e. iU > i N ) for all i, and H j > L j for all j . All individuals with the same abil-
ity provide the same effective labor supply. However, the amount of hours worked
in the labor market, and appropriately remunerated, is lower for needy individu-
als. Needy individuals of ability wi earn and consume wi less than their coun-
terparts with no needs. Among those individuals with the same needs, we have
the standard result that those with higher ability work and earn more. High-ability
unneedy individuals earn and consume the most. Low-ability needy individuals
earn and consume the least. It is not possible to disentangle a priori the relation-
ship between high-ability needy individuals and low-ability unneedy individuals
(i.e. cH N and cLU ). The precise relationship depends on the particular ability and
need gaps, as well as the specific functional form for the disutility of labor. In any
case, within each ability group needy individuals are worse off than unneedy ones,
and within each needs group low-ability individuals are worse off than high-ability
ones. It seems in principle fair to compensate for both differences in ability and
needs.
We represent in Fig. 1 the budget sets that the four types of individuals face depend-




-space where ̂i j = i j+ j denotes
the effective labor supply. The indifference curves of the four types of individuals have




-space. We also show a possible laissez-faire
solution. In the case depicted type-H N individuals are better of than type-LU ones
but the opposite can hold for alternative assumptions on wage gaps, needs gaps and
disutility of labor functional forms.
3 The first best
As a benchmark we analyze the first-best solution. The problem of the planner who
fully observes individual characteristics is expressed by the following Lagrangian:
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ci j − v
(
i j +  j
)] + μ (wii j − ci j
)]
, (3)
where μ is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the budget constraint. Given the
quasi-linearity of individual utilities, we use a strictly concave social utility transfor-
mation G (·) to reflect different degrees of aversion towards inequality.
The FOCs yield v′
(
i j +  j
) = wi and G ′i j = μ ∀i j , where G ′i j is the marginal
social utility of consumption accruing to individual i j . As before, iU = i N +  (i.e.
iU > i N ) for all i, and H j > L j for all j . Among individuals with the same needs,
the most productive work and consume more. Individuals with the same ability supply
the same effective amount of labor ̂, with those with higher needs working less in
the marketplace. However, in the first-best all individuals achieve the same level of




is equal for all i j , with
ci N = ciU for all i . How can this first-best allocation be decentralized? In addition to
the traditional redistribution between ability groups there is redistribution within each
ability group from unneedy to needy individuals.
Boadway and Pestieau (2003) show that full compensation for linear consumption
needs would require a rather simple tax-transfer scheme. In order to fully compensate
for needs in consumption c, and achieve the same effective consumption ĉ = c − c for
all the individuals with the same ability, a lump-sum transfer of (nLU + nHU ) c needs
to be provided to each needy individual and a lump-sum tax of (nL N + nH N ) c has to
be raised from each unneedy individual, regardless of their ability.5 In our case, since
5 This result is due to the quasi linearity of utility assumed by Boadway and Pestieau (2003) which implies
that income, consumption and needs are measured in the same unit.
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Fig. 2 First-best allocation
the valuation of the leisure needs differs by ability type, a transfer of equal magnitude
to both ability types within the needy group would not lead to full compensation.
A complete set of four net transfers {TL N , TH N , TLU , THU } would be required to
decentralize the first-best.
High-ability unneedy individuals pay a tax and low-ability needy individuals receive
a transfer but it is not possible to determine in general whether the intermediate types
pay taxes or receive transfers, as this depends on the particular wage gaps, needs gaps,





and transfers for the unneedy are represented in the vertical axis. The transfers for the
needy are represented at the vertical of . In the case depicted high-ability unneedy
individuals pay a tax, and all other types receive a transfer, with the low-ability needy
individuals receiving the largest transfer.
4 Tagging with leisure needs
In a second-best framework with imperfect information we need to incorporate self-
selection constraints (hereafter SSCs) to ensure individuals reveal their true types.
When ability is not observable the FB allocation represented in Fig. 2 is no longer
feasible. In order to show this we represent in Fig. 3 the indifference curves of the
four individual types in the (y, c)-space, where income y and consumption c are the
variables the planner observes in the second best. In this space the solid indifference
curves represented in Fig. 3 yield the same utility level. A type-H N individual would
be better off with the treatment designed for a type-L N . We represent the utility level
achieved by such a mimicker by the dashed indifference curve H N ’. Similarly a type-
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Fig. 3 Inability to achieve the FB allocation with asymmetric information
HU individual would be better off with the treatment designed for type-LU , at the
dashed indifference curve HU ’. Note also that the horizontal distance between the
indifference curves of the high-ability individuals in the first-best allocation is wH,
while the horizontal distance between two high-ability individuals attempting to mimic
the low-ability individuals in their respective groups is wL, which implies that in such
an event a type-HU mimicker would be better off than a type-H N mimicker. When
needs are observable, the relevant SSCs are the ones that relate high- and low-ability
individuals within each group.
In the following we focus on the maximin social objective,6 which has been com-
monly employed in the tagging literature.7 Tagging has often been criticised on the
basis that it can lead to violations of the principle of horizontal equity. This criti-
cism was acknowledged in the seminal Akerlof (1978) paper and has been recently
discussed in Mankiw and Weinzierl (2010). The latter stress that, when ability is unob-
servable, respecting horizontal equity implies neglecting information about individual
characteristics that, when correlated with ability, can make redistribution more effi-
cient. The maximin social objective serves as a compromise: it ensures equal utility
levels for the individuals at the bottom of both groups, yet allows for flexible policy
combinations that take that relevant information into account.
The Lagrangian for the maximin social criterion is:













yi j − ci j
)
6 We discuss the implications of employing a more general social welfare function in Appendix 3.
7 See for instance Boadway and Pestieau (2003, 2006) and Cremer et al. (2010).
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+λN
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where λ j stand for the Lagrange multipliers associated with SSCs within each needs
group j ( j = N , U ) and γ stands for the Lagrange multiplier associated with the
constraint that relates both low-ability types. The public information on leisure needs
implies that the two low-ability types can be separated. There is then no incentive
compatibility constraint linking the two low-ability types but instead a constraint that
ensures that the utility of type-LU individuals does not fall below the utility of type-
L N ones.
The FOCs associated with the consumption variables yield:
μ = 1, λN = nH N , λU = nHU and γ = nLU + nHU . (4)
Therefore, all the constraints bind. It is worth noticing that UL N = ULU in the maximin
outcome, regardless of the distribution of abilities in the needy and unneedy groups.



























































These conditions lead to the following proposition:
Proposition 1 In the second-best maximin optimum type-HU and type-H N individ-
uals face zero marginal taxes and supply the same effective amount of labor, which
coincides with the first-best level. Type-LU and type-L N individuals face positive
marginal tax rates and supply a lower effective amount of labor than in the first best,
but not necessarily the same.
Both low-ability types are distorted at the margin and supply a lower amount of
effective labor than in the first-best. The relationship between the marginal tax rates
they face and the effective amount of labor they supply depends, however, on the
distribution of ability types in each group. Both high-ability individuals face zero
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marginal tax rates and supply the same amount of effective labor, which coincides
with the first-best level.8 This does not mean however that they achieve the same
utility levels. It can be shown that the relationship between the utility levels achieved
by the two high-ability types depends on the distribution of ability types in each group.
Corollary 1 If nHU /nLU ≥ nH N /nL N , then ̂L N > ̂LU .
If the proportion of high-ability individuals in the two groups is the same, the
effective labor supply of low-ability needy individuals is larger. This also holds if the
proportion of high-ability individuals is lower in the needy group. The effective labor
supply of needy individuals is lower only if the proportion of high-ability individuals
is sufficiently large in the needy group. Using our example, low-ability handicapped
individuals supply a smaller amount of effective labor only when the proportion of
high-ability individuals among the handicapped is sufficiently large.
It is worth highlighting that it is optimal to impose different tax schedules in the
two groups even when the distribution of ability types is the same in both groups. This
contrasts with the linear consumption needs case in Boadway and Pestieau (2006)
where the tax treatments of two individuals with the same ability and different needs
would differ only by a lump-sum amount in those circumstances. Using our example,
the marginal distortion imposed on low-ability handicapped individuals is smaller. The
social planner can distort low-ability handicapped individuals less because, among
high-ability individuals, it is more costly for the handicapped to pretend to be low-
ability.
As the proportion of high-ability individuals decreases among the handicapped there
is even less incentive to distort the labor supply of low-ability handicapped individuals.
The opposite occurs when the proportion of high-ability individuals increases among
the handicapped. As noted above, the effective labor supply of low-ability handicapped
individuals may fall below that of low-ability non-handicapped individuals when the
proportion of high-ability individuals in the handicapped group is sufficiently large.
When this happens high-ability handicapped individuals are made worse off than the
non-handicapped high-ability ones.
Corollary 2 If ̂L N ≤ ̂LU then UHU > UH N .
The high-ability handicapped individuals are harmed when there are few low-ability
individuals among them, and they are hence more readily identified as high-ability.
When ̂L N > ̂LU the relationship between the utility levels of the high-ability types is
ambiguous. If the distribution of ability types is the same in both groups, high-ability
handicapped individuals are worse off but as the proportion of low-ability individuals
among the handicapped increases they may become better off.
We provide a numerical example in Sect. 5 to shed more light on these results.
8 With a separable but not quasilinear utility specification the high-ability individuals do not necessarily
supply the same effective amount of labor ̂, and these amounts do not longer coincide with the first-best
ones. We elaborate on this in Appendix 2.
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Table 1 First-best for different proportions
(pN , pU ) (0.7, 0.3) (0.5, 0.5) (0.3, 0.7)
Types L N LU H N HU L N LU H N HU L N LU H N HU
c 56.88 56.88 78.75 78.75 56.25 56.25 78.12 78.12 55.63 55.63 77.5 77.5
y 37.50 56.25 75 100 37.50 56.25 75 100 37.50 56.25 75 100
T 19.38 0.63 3.75 −21.25 18.75 0 3.12 −21.88 18.13 −0.62 2.5 −22.5
̂ 0.75 0.75 1 1 0.75 0.75 1 1 0.75 0.75 1 1
U 28.75 28.125 27.5
5 Numerical illustration
The functional form we employ for the numerical simulation is:









We use wH = 100 > wL = 75, N = 0.25 > U = 0,  = 2 and α = 0.01.
We assume that the proportion of individuals in each needy and unneedy group is
the same and focus on the role of varying the distribution of ability types across
the groups, keeping the overall proportion of low- and high-ability individuals in the
society however constant, so that the role of the different distribution of ability types
across groups is isolated from the role of the overall number of low- and high-ability
individuals in the society. We call pN the proportion of low-ability individuals in the
needy group and pU the proportion of low-ability individuals in the unneedy group.
We start from the benchmark case where both groups have the same proportions
of high- and low-ability individuals and explore subsequently the cases where the
proportions of high- and low-ability individuals differ, considering both the cases
where the proportion of low-ability individuals is higher in the needy group and the
opposite case where it is higher in the unneedy group. That is, we do not make any a
priori assumption on the correlation between productivity and need. Table 1 includes
the first-best solution and Table 2 the second-best with tagging.9
We mentioned in Sect. 3 that in the first-best type-HU pays a tax and type-L N
receives a transfer but it is impossible to determine in general whether the intermediary
types pay taxes or receive transfers. In Table 1 whether type-LU pays a tax or receives a
transfer depends on the distribution (i.e. (pN , pU )). For (0.7, 0.3) type-LU individuals
receive a transfer (0.63), for (0.5, 0.5) the transfer/tax is zero and for (0.3, 0.7) type-
LU individuals pay a tax (−0.62).
According to the results in Sect. 4, ̂L N > ̂LU and the marginal tax rate imposed
on the needy individual is lower when the distribution of ability types is the same in
both groups (i.e. (pN , pU ) = (0.5, 0.5) in Table 2). It is optimal to distort type-LU
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Table 2 Second-best with tagging for different proportions
(pN , pU ) (0.7, 0.3) (0.5, 0.5) (0.3, 0.7)
Types L N LU H N HU L N LU H N HU L N LU H N HU
c 46.57 32.43 81.51 78.56 39.89 38.13 78.45 80.48 33.58 44.48 76.30 83.26
y 29.89 27.84 75 100 22.83 39.13 75 100 13.14 47.37 75 100
T 16.68 4.60 6.51 −21.44 17.06 −1 3.45 −19.52 20.44 −2.89 1.30 −16.74
̂ 0.648 0.371 1 1 0.554 0.522 1 1 0.425 0.631 1 1
T ′ 0.135 0.505 0 0 0.261 0.304 0 0 0.433 0.158 0 0
U 25.54 25.54 31.51 28.56 24.52 24.52 28.45 30.48 24.54 24.54 26.30 33.26
individuals more at the margin because it is less costly for high-ability individuals in
the unneedy group to pretend to be low-ability than for their counterparts in the needy
group. There is a transfer towards the needy group (i.e. the handicapped individuals
in our example): for this particular parameter values both unneedy types consume
less than they earn (type-HU considerably less: TLU = −1 and THU = −19.52)
, and both needy types consume more than they earn (type-L N considerably more:
TL N = 17.06 and TH N = 3.45), yet type-HU remains better off than type-H N
(UHU = 30.48 > UH N = 28.45) and both are better off than in the first-best (i.e.
high-ability types benefit from the fact that ability is unobservable).
When the distribution of ability types differs by group, the observability of needs
conveys further information about the distribution of ability. When the proportion of
low-ability types in the needy group increases, the marginal distortion on type-L N
individuals decreases (their effective labor supply increases) and the opposite holds
for type-LU . For (pN , pU ) = (0.7, 0.3) type-H N individuals are made better-off
than type-HU ones (UH N = 31.51 > UHU = 28.56), who end up worse off than
in the first-best for these parameter values. The high-ability needy individuals benefit
from being mixed with a large proportion of low-ability ones in their group whereas
the high-ability unneedy individuals are harmed by being more easily identified as
high-ability as the proportion of low-ability individuals decreases in their group.
When the proportion of low-ability individuals in the needy group decreases (the
proportion of low-ability individuals in the unneedy group increases) the marginal
distortion on type-L N increases (and the marginal distortion on type-LU decreases).
The effective labor supply of type-L N individuals may fall below that of type-LU
ones. This is for example the case for (pN , pU ) = (0.3, 0.7) in Table 2: ̂L N =
0.425 < ̂LU = 0.631. High-ability needy individuals are harmed because they can
now be more readily identified as high-ability (i.e. their overall utility decreases and
may become lower than in the first best) whereas high-ability unneedy individuals
benefit from being mixed with an increasing number of low-ability ones.
6 Responsibility
We have assumed so far that individuals deserve compensation for their needs. Com-
pensation for leisure needs seems fair when needs stem from some kind of handicap
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outside the control of the individual. It is unclear, however, that the social planner
would want to compensate individuals for all possible types of leisure needs, partic-
ularly if those needs can be linked to some element of choice. Using our example,
this would correspond to time devoted to handicaps that are the outcome of lifestyle
decisions of individuals. In this section we consider the consequences of attempting
to hold the individuals responsible for their needs.10
We choose to capture responsibility for leisure needs in the social objective by




, from type-i j individual utility.11 This
is consistent with the egalitarian-equivalence approach in Fleurbaey (2008).12 This
approach takes a reference wage rate and for this wage rate computes the equivalent
budget set in the (, c) -space (not the (̂, c)-space). If the reference wage is zero,
and assuming v (0) = 0, this simply amounts to computing individual utility as c −
v
(
 + ) + v (): that is, counting only the extra disutility of .13
In the first-best maximin outcome with responsibility:












The labor supply of each type coincides with what was obtained in the first-best prob-









in consumption between unneedy and needy individuals




-space to enable comparison with
Fig. 2 in the compensation case.
The second-best problem with a maximin objective is captured by the following
Lagrangian:





























10 Admittedly, it is difficult and often questionable to blame individuals for errors they made in the past
motivated by some ignorance on the consequences of their choices or some urge of instant gratification.
The results in this section should be viewed as a benchmark.
11 Note that in general the adjustment required to make individuals responsible for their leisure needs
depends on the individuals’ preferences, including the utility specification and the nature of the leisure
needs, considered.
12 This is one possible representation of the concept of responsibility. Fleurbaey (1995) provides a rather
broad discussion of the treatment of responsibility in economic theory and in egalitarian theories of justice.
Fleurbaey and Maniquet (2006, 2007) deal with this issue in a framework more closely related to ours.
They characterize the optimal income tax when individuals differ in ability and preferences for leisure, and
consider fairness principles that capture the notions of compensation and responsibility.
13 This approach has the advantage that it does not interact with ability since the correction is the same for
the two ability types. It means that in the comparison of two individuals with identical needs and different
ability, the low-ability individual is deemed worse off whenever her utility is lower. We are very grateful to
Marc Fleurbaey for this suggestion.
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It is worth noticing that, although the social planner does not account for the disutility
of the time  in the social objective, individuals do account for this extra disutility in
the SSCs. The marginal distortions and the effective amount of labor supply remains
the same as in the compensation case. However the consumption and utility levels
differ from those achieved under compensation. In the first-best the consumption and
utility levels of two individuals with the same ability and different needs differ exactly









for the low-ability individuals but this is no longer the case for the high-ability
ones.
We provide a numerical illustration in Tables 3 and 4, for the first best and the sec-




) = 3.125. In Table 3 the gap between the consumption and utility levels achieved




for both ability types. In





, even if this no longer holds for consumption levels since the effective labor sup-
ply generally differs. In the second best the gap between the utility levels achieved by
high-ability individuals depends on the distribution of ability types in each group. For




when (pN , pU ) = (0.5, 0.5).
When the proportion of low-ability individuals in the needy group decreases the dif-
123
Author's personal copy
Tagging with leisure needs
Table 3 First-best with responsibility
(pN , pU ) (0.7, 0.3) (0.5, 0.5) (0.3, 0.7)
Types L N LU H N HU L N LU H N HU L N LU H N HU
c 55.31 58.44 77.19 80.31 54.69 57.81 76.56 79.69 54.06 57.19 75.94 79.06
y 37.5 56.25 75 100 37.5 56.25 75 100 37.5 56.25 75 100
T 17.81 2.19 2.19 19.69 17.19 1.56 1.56 −20.31 16.56 0.94 0.94 −20.94
̂ 0.75 0.75 1 1 0.75 0.75 1 1 0.75 0.75 1 1
U 27.19 30.31 27.19 30.31 26.56 29.69 26.56 29.69 25.94 29.06 25.94 29.06
Table 4 Second-best with responsibility
(pN , pU ) (0.7, 0.3) (0.5, 0.5) (0.3, 0.7)
Types L N LU H N HU L N LU H N HU L N LU H N HU
c 45.01 33.99 79.95 80.12 38.33 39.70 76.89 82.04 32.02 46.04 74.74 84.82
y 29.89 27.84 75 100 22.83 39.13 75 100 13.14 47.37 75 100
T 15.12 6.16 4.95 −19.88 15.50 0.57 1.89 −17.96 18.87 −1.33 −0.26 −15.18
̂ 0.648 0.371 1 1 0.554 0.522 1 1 0.425 0.631 1 1
T ′ 0.135 0.505 0 0 0.261 0.304 0 0 0.433 0.158 0 0
U 23.98 27.11 29.95 30.12 22.96 26.09 26.89 32.04 22.97 26.10 24.74 34.82
ference increases; when the proportion of low-ability individuals in the needy group




. This is for instance
the case for (pN , pU ) = (0.7, 0.3) . We interpret that when this occurs high-ability
individuals in the needy group are not made fully responsible for their needs.
7 Non-observable needs
We have assumed that needs are observable and can be used as a tag. We now briefly
discuss the implications of being unable to observe leisure needs. This exercise is rele-
vant because it enables us to assess differences with respect to the analysis carried out
above where needs could be observed and used as a tag. With unobservable ability and
leisure needs we have an optimal tax problem similar to the one studied by Cremer et al.
(2001).14 They show that the distribution of the two characteristics, and in particular
the correlation between them, plays a crucial role. Their analysis also emphasizes the
complexities involved in determining the pattern of binding self-selection constraints.
In our case, a simple comparison of the marginal rates of substitution of consumption
for income for different type-i j individuals,
14 Cremer et al. (2001) studies the optimal tax mix problem when individuals differ in unobservable














points to the impossibility of establishing in general whether the indifference curves
of type-H N individuals are steeper or flatter than those of type-LU ones. This has
important implications for the analysis of binding self-selection constraints in the
general four-types society.15
It is worth noticing a key difference with respect to the consumption needs case stud-
ied in Boadway and Pestieau (2006). The utility specification is the same: quasi-linear,
linear in consumption. If consumption needs were unobservable in their framework,
two individuals with the same ability but different needs would become effectively
indistinguishable: their indifference curves in the (y, c)-space exhibit the same shape,
even if the two types achieve different utility levels when allocated the same (y, c)-
bundle since the effective consumption of the needy individual is then lower. In our
framework, where needs enter the non-linear disutility of labor part, the indifference
curves of two individuals with the same ability and different needs exhibit, according
to (9), different shapes. This feature can be exploited to separate them in the case
of unobservable leisure needs, even if the unobservability of needs reduces the over-
all social welfare that can be achieved when compared to the case when needs are
observable and used as a tag.
8 Conclusions
The main aim of the paper was to investigate how differences in leisure needs, rep-
resented by different amounts of time individuals divert from leisure and paid labor
to a variety of duties, ought to be treated in the income tax system, and in particular
whether, and if so how, they should be compensated. To explore this issue we have
characterized the optimal redistributive tax scheme when individuals differ in imper-
fectly correlated earning ability and leisure needs. Individuals have private information
about their abilities but needs are observable. The population can then be separated
into groups and needs can be used as a tag. Weinzierl (2012) recently argued that
real-world taxes make surprisingly little use of tagging. He however highlighted that
some sizable tagging occurs in the tax treatment of disabled individuals and families
with children, which are precisely two examples where leisure needs play a key role.
We first assumed that the social planner deems differences in leisure needs worth
of compensation, on top of traditional compensation for productivity differences, and
characterized the optimal redistributive policy, and the extent of compensation for
leisure needs, with tagging. Even if leisure needs are observable the amount required
to fully compensate the individuals for their needs depends on their unobservable
ability (i.e. the cost of opportunity of the time devoted to those duties differs by
15 There are in principle two cases to analyze: (1) MRS11yc > MRS21yc > MRS12yc > MRS22yc and (2)
MRS11yc > MRS12yc > MRS21yc > MRS22yc . Both cases may be analyzed in the traditional Mirrlees setting and
yield the usual prediction of positive marginal tax rates for all but type-22 individuals.
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ability type). For the maximin objective the utility level achieved by the low-ability
types is the same, but the marginal tax rates imposed on them, and the effective labor
they supply, differ in the second best. We showed the marginal distortions depend
on the distribution of ability types in each group and affect the gap between the
utility levels achieved by the high-ability types: high-ability needy individuals can be
under- or overcompensated for leisure needs, with overcompensation arising when
the proportion of low-ability types in the needy group is sufficiently large (e.g. when
the proportion of low-ability individuals among the handicapped is sufficiently large).
We also showed that it is optimal to impose a different tax schedule in each group
even when the distribution of ability types is the same in both groups, which contrasts
with the results obtained with linear consumption needs. In particular we showed that
the marginal tax rate is smaller for low-ability needy individuals. This is due to the
fact that, because of the added disutility of leisure needs, it is more difficult for the
high-ability needy individuals to pretend to be low-ability (e.g. it is more difficult for
handicapped high-ability individuals to pretend to be low-ability).
We also considered an alternative social objective in which the social planner
deems individuals responsible for their leisure needs. We showed that attempt-
ing to make individuals responsible for their leisure needs does not correspond to
pure tagging, as it would be the case with linear consumption needs. Low-ability
needy individuals are made fully responsible for their needs but it is not always
possible to make high-ability needy individuals fully responsible, particularly so
when the proportion of low-ability individuals in the needy group is relatively
large. We also briefly discussed the implications of being unable to observe leisure
needs. In the appendix we discuss the implications of relaxing some of the main
assumptions.
Acknowledgments We are grateful to Richard Cornes, Stefan Dodds, Marc Fleurbaey, Matti Liski,
François Maniquet, Dirk van de Gaer, John Weymark and two anonymous referees for excellent remarks
and suggestions. Errors remain ours.
Appendix 1: Alternative specifications for leisure needs
We adopted an additive representation for leisure needs. For this specification we
argued that the amount required to fully compensate for needs is increasing in ability
type. In Fig. 1 we represented the budget sets and the laissez-faire allocation for the
four types. Individuals with the same ability wi supply the same amount of effective
labor but needy ones consume wi less.





δ j ≥ 1 (δ j = 1 for those individuals with no needs). This is a suitable representation
when needs imply a proportional reduction in productivity. If we set δU = 1 for
unneedy individuals and δN = δ > 1 for needy individuals, individuals with the same
ability wi supply the same amount of effective labor but high-ability needy individuals
consume wHHU (δ − 1) /δ less than their unneedy counterparts while low-ability
needy individuals consume wLLU (δ − 1) /δ than their unneedy counterparts. The
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Another alternative would be to employ v
(
i j + δ j/wi
)
with the parameter δ j ≥ 0
(δ j = 0 for those individuals with no needs). Note that this specification implies
that high-ability individuals are not only more productive at work but also more
productive at meeting their needs δ j . In this particular case the compensation does
not depend on the ability type. If we set δU = 0 for unneedy individuals and
δN = δ > 0 for needy individuals, individuals with the same ability supply the
same amount of effective labor and needy ones consume δ less regardless of their
ability.
Appendix 2: Alternative separable utility specification
The quasilinear utility specification we have adopted is restrictive but greatly simplifies
the analysis and the graphical illustration. It also allows us to compare the results with
those obtained for linear consumption needs in Boadway and Pestieau (2006). One
implication of the quasilinear assumption is that the effective labor supply of the
high-ability individuals is the same and is fixed at first-best levels throughout. With
a separable but not quasilinear utility specification the high-ability individuals do not
necessarily supply the same amount of effective labor ̂ in the second best, and the
amounts do not longer coincide with those in the first best.
The slope of the indifference curves in the (y, c)-space of a more general separable
specification Ui j = u
(
ci j














In the second best both high-ability types face zero marginal tax rates but it is now
possible for them to supply different amounts of effective labor as long as the consump-
tion levels are adjusted to maintain the non-distortion at the margin. It is possible to
show that among high-ability individuals the type that supplies less effective labor also
consumes more, and is hence better off. High-ability needy individuals may consume
more and supply less effective labor than high-ability unneedy ones if the proportion of
low-ability individuals in the needy group is sufficiently large. Otherwise high-ability
unneedy individuals supply less effective labour, consume more and are better off. We
provide a numerical example in Table 5 for the same parameter values and functional
forms as in Sect. 5 except that now u
(
ci j
) = log ci j .
Many results carry forward: for equal proportions, ̂L N > ̂LU with a lower mar-
ginal tax rate on type-L N . The high-ability unneedy individuals are better off, as in
Table 2 for equal proportions, but now this arises as a combination of both a smaller
effective labor supply and larger consumption than the high-ability needy individuals.
As the proportion of low-ability individuals in the needy group increases high-ability
needy ones may become better off, as was the case for (pN , pU ) = (0.7, 0.3) in
Table 2, but now high-ability needy individuals both consume more and supply less
effective labor than high-ability unneedy individuals.
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Table 5 Maximin with separable utility specification: second-best with different proportions
(pN , pU ) (0.7, 0.3) (0.5, 0.5) (0.3, 0.7)
Types L N LU H N HU L N LU H N HU L N LU H N HU
c 44.86 35.39 62.53 61.50 40.99 39.42 61.40 62.55 35.52 44.71 60.19 64.17
y 30.43 32.95 54.96 81.31 25.88 42.11 56.43 79.94 15.35 49.57 58.08 77.92
T 14.43 2.44 7.57 −19.81 15.11 −2.69 4.97 −17.39 20.17 −4.86 2.11 −13.75
̂ 0.656 0.439 0.800 0.813 0.595 0.5615 0.814 0.799 0.455 0.661 0.831 0.779
T ′ 0.216 0.585 0 0 0.35 0.41 0 0 0.569 0.212 0 0
U 3.373 3.373 3.496 3.458 3.359 3.359 3.454 3.497 3.363 3.363 3.407 3.554
Appendix 3: Alternative social objective
We adopted a maximin social objective. In our framework this objective ensured equal
utility levels for the individuals at the bottom of both groups. Other social welfare
functions can lead to different types of low-ability individuals achieving different
utility levels in the second best, an horizontal inequity outcome of tagging that is often








ci j − v
(
i j +  j
)]
,
where G (·) is a strictly concave social utility transformation that reflects different
degrees of aversion towards inequality. The maximin may be viewed as a particular
case of this specification when the aversion to inequality is infinite. We provide a
numerical example in Table 6 for the case in which G (·) takes a less inequality averse
logarithmic form.
For the case of equal proportions high-ability unneedy individuals are better off than
high-ability needy individuals, as was the case in Table 2, but now low-ability needy
individuals are better off than low-ability unneedy individuals . For equal proportions
marginal tax rates are still higher for low-ability unneedy individuals but both types
Table 6 Second-best with logarithmic social objective: different proportions
(pN , pU ) (0.7, 0.3) (0.5, 0.5) (0.3, 0.7)
Types L N LU H N HU L N LU H N HU L N LU H N HU
c 53.88 47.24 84.61 82.30 51.33 49.30 82.22 84.10 48.85 51.42 79.91 85.97
y 37.10 54.68 75 100 36.82 55.14 75 100 36.54 55.60 75 100
T 16.78 −7.44 9.61 −17.70 14.51 −5.84 7.22 −15.80 12.31 −4.18 4.91 −14.03
̂ 0.745 0.729 1 1 0.74 0.735 1 1 0.737 0.741 1 1
T ′ 0.007 0.028 0 0 0.012 0.020 0 0 0.017 0.012 0 0
U 26.15 20.66 34.61 32.29 23.88 22.28 32.22 34.10 21.67 23.95 29.91 35.97
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are distorted less, and achieve lower utility levels, than in the maximin case. As the
proportion of low-ability individuals increases in the needy group (decreases in the
unneedy group) low-ability unneedy individuals are made significantly worse off than
their needy counterparts.
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